This paper studies the implications of globalization for aggregate output and welfare when risk averse workers face the risk of unemployment. The impact of globalization on the welfare of workers and aggregate output depends on the degree of substitutability between domestic workers and imported inputs. When the degree of substitutability is high (low), then globalization reduces (increases) wages and increases (reduces) unemployment. Irrespective of the substitutability, free trade doesn't maximize the aggregate output. A small tari¤ (import subsidy) increases aggregate output when the substitutability is low (high), however, it can exacerbate the distributional con ‡ict. Domestic labor market policies such as unemployment bene…ts and severance payments can protect workers against labor income risk but the …ring restrictions do not. Free trade is optimal when labor market policies provide insurance against unemployment.
Introduction
While economists traditionally have devoted a lot of attention to the impact of various aspects of globalization on wage and income inequality, the policymakers and the public at large have been more concerned with the implications of globalization for jobs. As a result, there has been a recent surge in the research on the implications of globalization for jobs. The empirical literature using datasets from various countries and industries …nds mixed results. Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) …nd trade liberalization to be associated with lower unemployment at longer intervals in a cross-country study, however, there is a spike in unemployment in the immediate aftermath of trade liberalization. A recent in ‡uential study by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) …nds that the increased competition from Chinese imports has increased unemployment in the local U.S. labor markets and explains about one quarter of the contemporaneous aggregate decline in the U.S. manufacturing employment. Monarch, Park, and Sivadasan (2014) …nd a decline in employment for o¤shoring …rms. 2 Wright (2014) …nds that o¤shoring has di¤erential e¤ects on the employment of workers with di¤erent skills, however, the overall e¤ect seems to be positive. Gorg (2011) provides a survey of the empirical literature on o¤shoring and unemployment and …nds a diverse set of results: o¤shoring a¤ects employment adversely in some industries/countries and positively in others. Given the possibility of globalization increasing unemployment, at least in the short to medium run, a serious discussion of policies related to this issue is warranted which is the subject of this paper.
We construct a theoretical model with risk averse workers which is a key departure from the standard models of globalization and labor market. A single good is produced using domestic labor and imported inputs with a constant elasticity of substitution production function. While all workers are ex ante identical, the match speci…c productivity is random, and it is not worthwhile for …rms to keep very low productivity matches. Wage determination follows the competitive search tradition of Moen (1997) , and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) where …rms post a wage to attract workers. The advantage of this framework is that the decentralized outcome is e¢ cient when workers are risk neutral and therefore, any ine¢ ciency that arises is solely due to risk aversion. We show that the risk aversion of workers 2 O¤shoring in these papers refers to input trade and not the trade-in-tasks view of o¤shoring following the seminal work of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) . See Feenstra (2008) for an excellent discussion of older and newer concepts of o¤shoring. causes unemployment to be ine¢ ciently low. A consequence is that the decentralized aggregate output in the economy is lower than what would happen if a social planner were maximizing output.
In this set up, it is shown that the impact of globalization on labor market outcomes as well as aggregate output crucially depends on the degree of substitution/complementarity between domestic labor and imported inputs. If there is su¢ cient complementarity between domestic labor and imported inputs, then globalization improves the welfare of workers by lowering unemployment, however, the impact on aggregate output is ambiguous because the lowering of unemployment worsens the existing distortion. On the other hand, if imported inputs can be easily substituted for domestic labor then workers are adversely a¤ected by globalization: unemployment increases and wages decrease. However, the aggregate output increases unambiguously because globalization alleviates the existing distortion. 3 Irrespective of the substitution/complementarity between domestic labor and imports, free trade does not maximize aggregate output. A small tari¤ increases aggregate output when the substitutability between domestic labor and imported inputs is low while an import subsidy increases aggregate output when the substitutability is high. In both cases the commercial policy intervention reduces the welfare of workers, however, raising the possibility of a con ‡ict between equity and e¢ ciency.
Next, we explore the role of some commonly used social protection programs in restoring e¢ ciency in the decentralized case. 4 In particular, we study the roles of unemployment insurance (UI) and employment protection (EP) legislation. While the role of UI as an instrument of social protection is relatively well known, it is less clear how some elements of EP programs can act as an instrument of social protection. Employment protection refers to a host of mandatory restrictions pertaining to the separation of workers from …rms. The two key elements of EP programs are severance payments (SP) which is a transfer from …rms to workers and an administrative cost borne by employers which does 3 Our theoretical prediction that globalization can increase unemployment in some industries and reduce them in others is consistent with the diverse empirical …ndings summarized in Gorg (2011) . A more direct evidence is provided in Harrison and McMillan (2011) . Using data on the U.S. multinationals, they …nd that when the tasks performed by the subsidiary of a multinational are complementary to the tasks performed at home, o¤shoring (in the sense of input trade) leads to more job creation in the United States; however, o¤shoring causes job losses when the tasks performed in the subsidiary are substitutes for the tasks performed at home. not accrue to employees directly. Given the widespread use of SP, a serious discussion of this policy is warranted. 5 We show that both UI and SP can restore production e¢ ciency in the decentralized case. 6 That is, by protecting workers against the risk of unemployment, both UI and SP make the economy production e¢ cient. The e¢ cient level of SP fully insures workers against the risk of unemployment while the e¢ cient level of UI provides incomplete insurance. A consequence is that while the aggregate output, pro…ts, and unemployment are the same under both policies, the worker welfare is higher with e¢ cient SP than with e¢ cient UI. Therefore, SP Pareto dominates UI in our set up. An administrative cost of …ring (which is not a transfer to workers), on the other hand, exacerbates the existing ine¢ ciency and does not provide insurance to workers. Since unemployment is ine¢ ciently low, it turns out that a …ring subsidy can restore e¢ ciency. What this suggests is that not all components of employment protection have the same e¢ ciency and welfare e¤ects, an insight that may be relevant for empirical work.
Empirical work on the subject lumps together all elements of employment protection in constructing an aggregate index of employment protection. We also show that globalization in the presence of e¢ -cient labor market policies unambiguously increases aggregate output. There is no need for commercial policy intervention to increase aggregate output when e¢ cient labor market policies are in place.
The baseline model discussed above abstracts from matching frictions to focus on job destruction which creates a role for severance payments. Since matching frictions are an integral part of the unemployment story, in an online appendix we extend the model to incorporate matching frictions. Now the adjustment in response to globalization takes place through changes in both job creation and job destruction. Again the decentralized outcome is production ine¢ cient due to the risk aversion of workers. The impact of globalization on labor market outcomes and aggregate output is similar to that in the baseline model. Free trade is not optimal and a commercial policy intervention increases aggregate output. Looking at labor market policies, one di¤erence from the baseline model is that since severance payments (SP) are given at the time of separation, they cannot be used to insure workers 5 In a cross-country study of severance payments, Holzmann et al. (2011) …nd that out of 183 countries for which information is available, 152 have mandated severance payments schemes (82 percent), 18 have quasi-mandated schemes through comprehensive collective agreements, and only 13 (7 percent) have neither. 6 The di¤erence between the two in our static framework is in terms of funding. While SP is either paid directly by …rms or indirectly through a tax on …ring, UI is …nanced either through a tax on workers or a payroll tax on …rms.
who are unemployed because they fail to match. Unemployment insurance (UI) can be used to insure unmatched workers as well as …red workers. Therefore, either UI alone or a combination of UI and SP can be used to achieve e¢ ciency in the decentralized setting. Consistent with the welfare results earlier, worker welfare is higher with a policy that combines SP with UI than UI alone. That is, SP can complement UI when unemployment arises due to a combination of job destruction and matching frictions.
Related Literature
Many papers studying the labor market implications of globalization in economies with search frictions carry out comparative static exercises with respect to labor market policies such as unemployment bene…ts, hiring and …ring costs etc. 7 A common approach in these papers is to lump these labor market interventions together with search frictions and to conclude that the implications of these interventions are similar to that of an increase in search frictions. This equivalence arises because workers are risk neutral in these papers. An important contribution of our paper is to show that the welfare implications of these policy interventions are very di¤erent from an increase in search frictions when workers are risk averse. By ignoring risk aversion these papers miss out on the insurance role that these interventions play in protecting workers against the risk of unemployment in both closed and open economies.
The paper most closely related to our work is Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) , which to the best of our knowledge is the only paper to study the policy implications of globalization in a model with unemployment and risk averse workers. Our model di¤ers from their model in several respects. While they assume domestic labor and o¤shored inputs to be perfect substitutes, we work with a CES production function which allows us to study cases when o¤shored inputs are complementary to domestic labor as in the seminal paper by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) where this raises the possibility of wages increasing for workers whose jobs are o¤shored. In fact, we get a cuto¤ value of the elasticity of substitution parameter such that if the elasticity of substitution is higher than the cuto¤ then the workers are hurt by globalization, but gain otherwise. Additionally, while wages are determined through Nash bargaining in their set up, …rms post wages in our framework. A consequence is that the distortion in our framework arises solely due to the risk aversion of workers even in the presence of search frictions. This allows us to focus on policy issues arising from risk aversion. 8 Also, while in Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) unemployment arises solely because some workers are unmatched, in our baseline model unemployment arises solely from job destruction while in the extension unemployment arises due to both matching frictions and endogenous job destruction. Additionally, while Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) focus on unemployment bene…ts, we study severance payments and unemployment bene…ts as alternative ways to provide social protection, and in this sense the two papers are complementary. Finally, our set up with endogenous job destruction allows us to discuss the roles of other …ring related policies such as administrative burden of …ring, …ring subsidy etc.
While most of the recent papers on labor market implications of globalization use models with risk neutral workers thereby obviating the need for social protection, there is an older literature in international trade dealing with risk averse agents. For example, Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) construct a model with risk averse agents where trade can be Pareto inferior to autarky. Dixit and Rob (1994) show how trade may be inferior to autarky in the presence of missing insurance markets when individuals are risk averse. Due to missing insurance markets, the decentralized solution di¤ers from the planner's problem and hence trade can be inferior to autarky or even a tari¤ equilibrium can be inferior to autarky. A recent working paper by Allen and Atkin (2016) theoretically and empirically studies the implications of a decrease in trading cost for the welfare of risk averse farmers using a dataset from India. Theoretically, they show that trade liberalization provides unambiguous gains if the comparative advantage is in the safe crop but has an ambiguous e¤ect if the comparative advantage is in the risky crop. In the former case trade induces farmers to specialize more in safe crops which reduces the amount of risk they bear while in the latter case it increases the risk they bear. In the empirical estimation they …nd that trade increases the volatility in income which points towards the case of comparative advantage in the risky crop. That is, the gains from trade are reduced due to increased volatility. Our paper shares the idea that gains from trade are lower if trade exacerbates the existing distortion arising 8 For example, we are able to show that free trade is not optimal and and commercial policy interventions can increase aggregate output. With Nash bargaining in the presence of search frictions and large …rms, as in Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) , there are two distortions even with risk neutral workers when large …rms hire many workers: search externalities and the "overhiring e¤ect" identi…ed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) . This makes the policy analysis more complicated in such a setting. from missing insurance market with these studies. However, these studies do not deal with the labor market risk arising from unemployment which is the focus of our paper.
Among other related papers, Brander and Spencer (1994), Feenstra and Lewis (1994) , and Davidson and Matusz (2006) study various policies to compensate the workers who lose from trade. However, workers are risk neutral in these papers. Closer to our approach is the paper by Brecher and Chaudhuri (1994) which examines the issue of Pareto superiority of free trade over autarky through Dixit-Norman compensation schemes when there is unemployment in the economy caused by e¢ ciency wage considerations and unemployed workers get unemployment compensation. In this setting, workers who become unemployed due to trade can be fully compensated for their losses only if unemployment bene…ts become equal to the wages. However, in this case, no e¤ort will be undertaken by any worker, and hence output will become zero. Therefore, fully compensating workers who lose their jobs is not feasible. Even though this paper has unemployment as well as unemployment compensation, workers are risk neutral and hence the insurance motive for unemployment bene…ts is not present. As far as the related work on social protection is concerned, while much work in labor/macro economics focuses on the administrative cost aspect of employment protection, Pissarides (2001) and Blanchard and Tirole (2008) highlight the potential role of severance payments in providing insurance.
Our static model of endogenous job destruction with large …rms employing multiple inputs can be viewed as a generalization of the one-worker-…rm model of endogenous job destruction in Blanchard and Tirole (2008) . The large …rm model with heterogeneous match speci…c productivity of workers is also similar to Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010). In their model …rms have to screen the matched workers after bearing a cost to …nd out if the productivity of workers is above a cuto¤. Workers below the cuto¤ are not hired. Given …rm heterogeneity, more productive …rms screen more which leads to di¤erent …rms having workers with di¤erent average productivities resulting in di¤erent wages. This set up allows them to study the implications of globalization for wage inequality. Since our focus is on the employment e¤ects of globalization with risk averse workers, we create a simpler framework with homogeneous …rms where the match speci…c productivities are revealed to …rms costlessly as in Blanchard and Tirole (2008) . The model also bears similarity to Fernandez (1992) where …rms hire risk averse workers before the realization of output prices and the contracts take the form of state contingent wages and employment probabilities. Fernandez (1992) excludes the possibility of transfers to unemployed workers either by …rms or by the planner. Therefore, the decentralized outcome is constrained Pareto optimal in her setting and policies (including trade policies) cannot improve upon the decentralized outcome.
To summarize, the key contributions of this paper are the following. In the absence of any government intervention, the decentralized equilibrium is ine¢ cient. The impact of globalization on aggregate output, unemployment, and the welfare of workers depends crucially on the substitutability/complementarity between domestic labor and imported inputs. However, free trade is not optimal irrespective of this. A small tari¤ increases aggregate output if the imported inputs are complementary to domestic labor while an import subsidy is the optimal policy if imported inputs are substitutes for domestic labor. While a trade intervention increases aggregate output, it has undesirable distributional consequences because it reduces the welfare of workers. Since the distortion in the economy arising from the risk aversion of workers is of domestic nature, labor market interventions like severance payments or unemployment insurance make the economy production-e¢ cient. Additionally, severance payments are superior to unemployment bene…ts when job destruction is the sole source of unemployment, and a combination of severance payments and unemployment bene…ts is superior to unemployment bene…ts alone when unemployment is caused by both job destruction and matching frictions. Finally, with e¢ cient labor market policies in place, globalization increases aggregate output unambiguously even though it may have adverse distributional consequences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the baseline model showing the ine¢ ciency of the decentralized equilibrium. Section 3 studies the implications of globalization for labor market and welfare and analyzes the optimal trade policy. Section 4 provides an analysis of labor market policies. Section 5 provides a discussion of robustness issues. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
The Model
The production function for a single …nal good is given by
where L e is the domestic labor in e¢ ciency units and M denotes foreign produced inputs. captures the elasticity of substitution between domestic labor and foreign produced inputs and < 1 captures the diminishing returns. Diminishing returns can arise either due to limited span of control as in Lucas (1978) or due to the presence of some speci…c factor in …xed supply. It is worthwhile making the notion of substitutability/complementarity between domestic labor and imported inputs more precise given that many results depend on it. In our set up whether domestic workers gain (lose) from globalization depends on whether the domestic labor and imported inputs are gross q-complements (q-substitutes)
where q-complementarity is de…ned in the sense of Hicks elasticity of complementarity: two inputs are gross q-complements (q-substitutes) in the production of a variable output if an increase in the quantity of one input increases (decreases) the marginal product of another. 9 With our production function, the two inputs are gross q-complements (q-substitutes) if < (>)
: Clearly, with = 1; they will always be gross q-complements. < 1 allows us to discuss both the cases of gross q-substitution and gross q-complementarity.
It is also assumed that there is a continuum of domestic …rms of unit mass so there is no distinction between a …rm level variable and an economy level variable. Workers are identical ex ante but their match speci…c productivity, ; is random. Without loss of generality, assume that is drawn from a uniform distribution over [0; 1]. This is a standard distributional assumption in the literature on endogenous job destruction (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) ).
As mentioned in the introduction, in the model presented in the text we assume the matching to be frictionless and in an online appendix we extend the model to allow for matching frictions. Once the match speci…c productivity of a worker is revealed, the …rm can decide whether to retain the worker or …re them. If …rms use a cuto¤ rule whereby they retain workers with productivity above c and …re others, then the average productivity of retained workers is
If they hire L h workers then they retain (1 c )L h of them, and hence the amount of labor in e¢ ciency units that is used in production is
where L is the number of workers retained by the …rm. Therefore, the production function (1) can be written as
The above implies that …rms face a quantity-quality trade-o¤ in the hiring of workers. To produce a given level of output, they can go for higher quality and lower quantity or vice-versa. Since …ring is 9 See Sato and Koizumi (1973) for details.
costly, higher quality comes at a higher cost.
The total number of workers in the economy is denoted by L. Denote the aggregate pro…t of …rms by : When = 1 pro…ts are going to be zero.
All workers are risk averse with the utility function given by
where x is their income. Since all workers are matched in the baseline model and some are retained while others are …red, the income of workers when they are retained is x = w; where w is the wage, while the income when they are …red is x = z where z is the value of leisure/home production and should be thought of as the wage equivalent of being unemployed.
Firms post wages and …ring rates to attract workers. Since workers are risk averse while …rms are risk neutral, …rms will have an incentive to insure workers. One way this can be done is through a severance payment to the …red worker. We are going to discuss the implications of voluntary severance payments paid by …rms later. For now let us assume that …rms are unable to o¤er severance payments.
Denote the wage rate posted by …rm-i by w i and the cuto¤ productivity by ci (same as …ring rate
given the uniform distribution of ): Workers direct their applications to the …rm whose (w i ; ci ) pair gives them the highest expected utility. Suppose W is the highest utility that a worker can expect from a job at another …rm. Now, in order to attract workers, (w i ; ci ) must satisfy
E¤ectively, for any …ring rate that the …rm posts, (5) determines the wage that the …rm has to o¤er. 10 If a …rm wants to raise the average productivity of its workforce by being more selective (higher ci ) then it will have to o¤er higher wages. The main advantage of using wage posting is that, as shown later, the decentralized equilibrium is e¢ cient (corresponds to the planner's solution) when workers are risk neutral. Therefore, any ine¢ ciency in the model arises due to the risk aversion of workers.
This allows us to focus on the policy issues arising from risk aversion. Even though looking at (5) one 1 0 Note that this way of modeling labor market is similar in spirit to the competitive search framework of Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) where …rms post wages and workers direct their search. The di¤erence is that in the competitive search framework …rms post wages, which for a given W determines the length of the queue, qi; and consequently how fast the vacancy is …lled. That is, a …rm is choosing a pair (wi; qi) to ensure that the worker gets a utility of W; while in our framework the …rm chooses (wi; ci) to ensure that the worker gets a utility of W:
gets the impression that …rms can choose di¤erent pairs of (w; c ) to satisfy (5), it can be shown from the …rm's maximization exercise that all …rms end up posting the same wage rate. 11 Therefore, in the analysis below we drop the …rm subscript i:
Denote the per unit price of the imported input by : Now, …rms perform the following pro…t maximization exercise.
M ax
L;M;w; c fZ wL M g subject to the constraint
In writing the …rst order conditions for the above maximization exercise and throughout the paper, we use the following compact notation:
Using % to denote the Lagrangian multiplier on the constraint in (6), the …rst order conditions for the above maximization are given by
Intuitively, the l.h.s of (7) is the marginal product of an additional retained worker while the r.h.s is the cost of a retained worker. Similarly, the l.h.s of (10) is the bene…t of a higher c , which for a given L results in higher average productivity of these workers. The r.h.s is the cost of a higher c resulting from the higher wages to satisfy the wage constraint because when the probability of getting …red is higher it must be o¤set by a higher wage. This cost is related to the risk aversion of workers.
The greater the risk aversion, the greater the cost in terms of meeting the reservation wage of workers. 1 1 This can be accomplished by noting that the wage rate can be expressed as a function of W and c in the …rm's maximization exercise. Since each …rm takes W as given, it ends up choosing the same c; which implies the same wage rate.
Since all workers are matched, the number employed simply equals the number not …red and therefore, the aggregate labor market equilibrium condition is given by
The 5 equations (7)- (10), and (11) determine w; L; M; c ; and %:
It is shown in the appendix that using (7)- (10) and (11) we can obtain the following two key equations in w and c which are useful for proving the existence of equilibrium as well as comparative statics.
where we use the following compact notation:
When workers are risk neutral, the existence and uniqueness of an interior equilibrium with c 2 (0; 1) and w > z is easily established in the appendix. When workers are risk averse, the possibility of a corner solution ( c = 0) with full employment, but w > z; exists. This case can be ruled out by assuming that workers are not too risk averse. 12 This yields the following result. To show the production-ine¢ ciency of the decentralized equilibrium we solve the planner's problem next.
Planner' s problem
The planner can choose a cuto¤ productivity, c ; o¤shored input, M; and employment L to maximize the following expression for aggregate output.
The planner recognizes that higher c leads to higher unemployment, that is L = (1 c )L; and therefore, the planner maximizes
where
It is shown in the appendix that the e¢ cient level of c is given by the solution to the following equation.
It is proved in the appendix that the equation above has a unique solution which we call 
Comparison of decentralized equilibrium with the planner' s problem
To facilitate comparison of the planner's problem with the decentralized equilibrium derived earlier, we derive the following equation determining c in the decentralized equilibrium.
where z 0 w :
Case of Risk Neutral Workers
Suppose the utility function is of the form: U (x) = ax + b where a > 0 and b are constants. It immediately follows that w = z and hence, (18) corresponds to (17) , which gives the following result.
Lemma 1: When workers are risk neutral the decentralized equilibrium is production-e¢ cient.
That is, when workers are risk neutral, the decentralized equilibrium unemployment rate and output are same as one obtained by a social planner interested in maximizing output. Therefore, when workers are risk neutral there are no distortions in the model economy from the point of view of production e¢ ciency. The results parallel the e¢ ciency of decentralized equilibrium in a competitive search framework as in Moen (1997) . Similar to Moen (1997) , wage posting by …rms delivers an e¢ cient outcome in the decentralized case. When we incorporate search frictions in the extension provided in the online appendix, it is still the case that the decentralized outcome is e¢ cient when workers are risk neutral.
Case of risk averse workers
Recall that the value of c in the planner's problem is denoted by To gain more intuition for this result, compare the equation determining c in the planner's problem given in (17) with the decentralized case given in (18) . The left hand side of these equations gives the bene…t from hiring an additional worker by lowering c slightly. The right hand side is the cost of doing so. In the planner's problem the cost is simply z while in the decentralized case the cost is w :
That is, when a …rm retains an extra worker by lowering c ; its cost of hiring that worker is lower than w. This is because the …rm can a¤ord to o¤er a lower wage contract because the probability of unemployment is lower. This additional e¤ect is captured by the term : In the risk neutral case w exactly equals z the social opportunity cost of a worker, and hence the decentralized outcome corresponds to the planner's problem. When workers are risk averse then w < z, and hence …rms
hire more than what is optimal from the point of view of production e¢ ciency. Essentially, the risk aversion of workers causes …rms to overhire.
The result in lemma 2 is similar to the result of Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) that the decentralized equilibrium level of unemployment is too low when workers are risk averse. While they work with single-worker-…rms and the source of unemployment in their framework is search frictions, here we obtain this result in a large …rm model with endogenous job destruction.
Lemmas 1 and 2 clearly establish that the decentralized outcome is production-ine¢ cient due to the risk aversion of workers.
As mentioned earlier, we restricted …rms from making severance payments to …red workers. What happens when …rms can make severance payments?
When …rms o¤er severance payments voluntarily
Denote the severance payment by the …rms by f w : Now, the maximization problem of …rms is given by
M ax
L;M;w; c;fw
It is shown in the appendix that in this case the equilibrium wage and severance payments are such that the workers are fully insured: w = f w + z: A consequence is that the equilibrium unemployment is given by (17) . That is, the equilibrium is production-e¢ cient. Therefore, the ine¢ ciency arising from the risk aversion and lack of insurance can be eliminated by a severance payments contract.
A natural question to ask then is why don't …rms o¤er severance payments voluntarily. The literature has suggested a couple of answers that goes beyond the model: wage rigidity and contracting issues. Note that in order for …rms to o¤er insurance through severance payments, they should have the ability to reduce the wages of employed workers. However, wage rigidity may prevent them from doing so. Minimum wage regulation would be an example of wage rigidity. In the context of our model, it is possible that the minimum wage doesn't bind when …rms don't o¤er severance payments, but would start binding once …rms o¤er severance payments and thereby reduce the wage they desire to o¤er.
Firms may be constrained from lowering wages in exchange for severance payments due to e¢ ciency wage considerations as well. That is, if workers shirk then a higher wage may be required to prevent shirking, and a lower wage in this setting may violate the no shirking constraint.
Alternatively, in real world severance payments rely on a long term contract whereby workers accept a lower wage in return for a promise to get severance payments when they are …red. Now, contractual
frictions can create problems with this kind of contract. Modeling these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, but they suggest why there may be a role for mandated severance payments. In addition,
Blanchard and Tirole (2008) provide some other reasons why even when …rms are allowed to o¤er severance payments, the layo¤ decision of …rms is not e¢ cient, for example when there are limits to insurance due to moral hazard, or if …rms face …nancial constraints. We don't want to complicate the model too much, however, to get a ‡avor of how introducing some of these factors will lead to production-ine¢ ciency in the decentralized case, suppose that workers su¤er some non-pecuniary losses from being unemployed given by B > 0: That is, their utility when unemployed is U (f + z) B: This change doesn't a¤ect the planner's problem so the production e¢ cient level of c is same as before.
However, the decentralized outcome becomes production-ine¢ cient even when …rms can o¤er severance payments (shown in the appendix). 13 While voluntary severance payments is enough to deliver production e¢ ciency in our baseline model where the sole source of unemployment is job destruction, when we extend the model to introduce matching frictions (shown in online appendix) it is not going to be enough. Voluntary severance payments either by themselves or in combination with unemployment bene…ts paid to unmatched workers do not lead to production e¢ ciency. In that extension we show that production e¢ ciency can be attained through a combination of mandatory severance payments to …red workers and unemployment bene…ts to unmatched workers.
Given the discussion above, in the text below to keep things simple we assume that …rms do not o¤er severance payments. However, when discussing mandated severance payments in the baseline model, it should be borne in mind that …rms have an incentive to o¤er it voluntarily.
Impact of Globalization
Globalization is captured by a decrease in the price, ; of imported inputs. A decrease in is like a productivity shock for the economy, so it yields bene…ts. However, since the economy is distorted to begin with, we are in a second best world. In this case, the impact of globalization depends on whether it ameliorates the existing distortions or worsens them. Since the unemployment rate is suboptimally low in the decentralized case, if globalization increases the unemployment rate, it ameliorates the distortion and if reduces the unemployment rate, then it worsens the distortion.
The following proposition is proved on the impact of globalization in a decentralized equilibrium. 
:
Intuitively, a decrease in has two e¤ects on the demand for domestic labor. Since imported inputs 1 3 For this result we do not require the non-pecuniary cost of unemployment to enter the utility function linearly. The result obtains more generally. For example, if the utility in the case of unemployment is BU (x) where B < 1 and x is the income in the unemployment state, the results go through.
are cheaper now, …rms substitute away from domestic labor. However, there is a productivity/scale e¤ect because …rms want to produce more output and hence hire more of both inputs. For >
To see the impact of globalization on production-e¢ ciency, note that the aggregate output in the economy can be written as
where Z P is de…ned in (16) . Recall from (15) that the above is exactly the output that the planner maximizes. In the appendix we obtain the following 3 expressions for the impact of globalization on aggregate output, pro…ts, and worker welfare.
Let us …rst obtain the results for the risk neutral worker case. In this case = w z; and it immediately follows from (21) that globalization increases aggregate output unambiguously. It also follows from proposition 2 that workers' welfare increases if < : It also follows from proposition 2 that the impact on pro…ts and the welfare of workers is similar to the one in the risk neutral case. The result is summarized in the proposition below. ; globalization unambiguously increases aggregate output but the impact is ambiguous when < : Pro…ts increase unambiguously in the latter case, but the impact is ambiguous in the former case. In the special case of = 1; pro…ts are zero but globalization unambiguously increases aggregate output and worker welfare. 14 Intuitively, since unemployment is ine¢ ciently low in the decentralized equilibrium, when a reduction in increases unemployment, it reduces the existing distortion and thereby unambiguously increases the production-e¢ ciency of the economy. In the other case, a reduction in unemployment worsens the existing distortion which must then be weighed against the direct positive e¤ect of a decrease in (which is like a terms of trade gain). Even though the impact of globalization on aggregate output and pro…ts is theoretically ambiguous in the < 1 1 case, we were unable to …nd a parametric con…guration where globalization actually reduced output or pro…ts. That is, in our numerical exercise we found the direct positive e¤ect of globalization dominating the indirect negative e¤ect on output due to the worsening of existing distortion. Therefore, this case may be viewed more appropriately as one where the gains from globalization are smaller because it worsens the distortion. Similarly, the increased income of workers reduces pro…ts but is not enough to outweigh the direct positive e¤ect on pro…ts due a cheapening of imported inputs. However, results based on numerical exercises should not be treated as de…nitive because numerical exercises are not exhaustive and we are unable to resolve these ambiguities theoretically. 15 1 4 = 1 case also corresponds to the case when instead of a …xed mass of …rms, there is free entry of …rms. In this case pro…ts will be zero and all the gains from globalization will accrue to workers. Essentially, these alternatives make it a one factor model in which case the gains from globalization must accrue to this factor, and hence, labor cannot lose from globalization. However, risk aversion still implies the ine¢ ciency of the decentralized equilibrium. 1 5 In our numerical exercises we also found pro…ts to be increasing with globalization in the < 1 1 case even when workers are risk neutral despite the ambiguous results mentioned in proposition 3.
Optimal Trade Policy
Whether a decrease in increases or reduces aggregate output, free trade is not optimal due to the distortion pointed out in lemma 2. This suggests that trade interventions can be e¢ ciency enhancing.
To see this, suppose t is the per unit tari¤ (import subsidy if t < 0) on the imported input. In the presence of tari¤s, the expression for the aggregate output of the economy remains the one given in (20) .
While discussing the impact of a tari¤ in this set up one question that needs to be answered is what happens to the tari¤ revenue. The algebra is much simpler if we assume that the tari¤ revenue goes to pro…t owners or the money for import subsidy comes from the pro…t owners. 16 In this case, the wage constraint of workers given in (6) is una¤ected. It is shown in the appendix that, starting from free trade, the impact of a tari¤ on aggregate output is given by
Since a tari¤ raises the price of the imported input, proposition 2 above implies that ; while an import subsidy increases aggregate output when > 
:
Intuitively, since the distortion in the free trade situation causes unemployment to be less than the optimal unemployment, when < It is also shown in the appendix that in the case when tari¤ revenue goes to …rms the welfare of workers decreases while the pro…t of …rms gross of tari¤ revenue increases as a result of optimal commercial policies. If workers are worse o¤ than pro…t owners then the optimal commercial policy in this case is going to be regressive. That is, it leads to an equity-e¢ ciency trade o¤. While it increases production e¢ ciency, it leads to worse equity outcomes. To ensure the gains from the improvement in production e¢ ciency are widely distributed, redistribution will be required. 17 The result in proposition 5 is similar to the Copeland (1989) result that a tari¤ is optimal if the distorted sector is import-competing. In his model the division of labor between those who need to be monitored (type 1 jobs) and those who do not (type 2 jobs) is distorted. If the import competing sector is more intensive in type 1 jobs, then a small tari¤ is optimal. Also, similar to Copeland (1989) a tari¤ in our setting improves aggregate output but has adverse distributional consequences if workers are poorer than pro…t owners. In Copeland (1989) type 1 workers have higher wages and therefore, they gain from a tari¤. Copeland (1989) discusses the role of transfers from type 1 workers to type 2 workers and shows how they can be used to o¤set the distributional consequences of a tari¤. Transfers by themselves are e¢ ciency reducing in Copeland (1989) because they worsen the incentive constraint for type 1 workers. He shows that a transfer (that keeps the utility of type 2 workers at the initial level) completely o¤sets the e¢ ciency gains obtained from a tari¤. A lump sum transfer from pro…t owners to workers in our set up would not have the e¢ ciency reducing e¤ect as in Copeland (1989) .
Therefore, if a tari¤ is combined with a transfer, the latter wouldn't o¤set the e¢ ciency gains from the former as in Copeland (1989) .
Also, labor market interventions discussed below will be superior to trade policy intervention. In our setting a transfer from employed to unemployed workers is e¢ ciency enhancing. In fact, the unemployment insurance …nanced by a tax on employed workers precisely does this in our framework.
Severance payments is a transfer from …rms to unemployed workers and is also e¢ ciency enhancing.
Labor Market Policies
We study some common labor market policies-severance payments, unemployment insurance, and …ring taxes which are not transfers to workers-and analyze their potential to restore production-e¢ ciency in the economy and analyze the impact of globalization in the presence of these policies. 1 7 While we have analytically shown the distributional con ‡ict arising from a production-e¢ ciency enhancing commercial policy for the case when tari¤ revenue is distributed to pro…t owners, the result can arise even when tari¤ revenue goes to workers because the direct e¤ect of an optimal commercial policy is to reduce wages and increase unemployment. In the special case of = 1, however, it is shown in the online appendix that the optimal commercial policy intervention, which is a tari¤, improves the welfare of workers. Since workers receive all income in this case, there is no distributional con ‡ict.
Decentralized equilibrium with alternative policies
The …rst policy we discuss is a …ring tax, f t ; by the government which is not a transfer to workers.
This can be thought of as the administrative burden imposed on …rms with the aim of reducing …ring.
Even though …ring subsidy is never used in practice, we discuss it for the sake of completeness. Next, we discuss mandated severance payments (SP), f w . This is a transfer from the …rm to the …red worker.
Finally, we discuss unemployment insurance (UI) given to …red workers. In the public …nance literature the funding of UI takes many alternative forms: a lump sum tax on all workers; a tax on only employed workers; or a payroll tax on …rms. The results in all cases are qualitatively similar and we choose to discuss only the case where the tax is on employed workers (same as in Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) ).
Denote the unemployment bene…ts by b: This is …nanced by a tax, ; on employed workers, therefore, the balanced budget condition is given by
Note that if UI is …nanced by a tax imposed on …rms for each worker they …re, then in our current framework it is equivalent to the mandated severance payments. Therefore, the key di¤erence between SP and UI in the baseline model is in terms of …nancing. While the former is either paid directly by …rms to …red workers or funded by a …ring tax collected by the government, the latter is funded through one of the three alternative ways discussed above. 18 Below we develop a uni…ed framework that nests all these policies and then discuss each in turn.
Our goal is to see if production-e¢ ciency can be restored using these policies. The equilibrium with policies is solved using a two stage game where the planner chooses the policy in the …rst stage and then …rms maximize their pro…ts taking the policies as given. With the above policies in place the …rms perform the following maximization exercise in the second stage.
M ax
L;M;w; c Z wL
subject to the constraint
The …rst order conditions for the above maximization exercise are derived in the appendix where we derive the following condition characterizing the equilibrium choice of c :
where p
: Below we discuss each of the policies mentioned earlier in turn.
Administrative cost of …ring
Setting b = = f w = 0 in (25) obtain
in this case:
Comparing (26) to (17), note that …ring taxes lead to e¢ cient c if p = w z f t : The concavity of U ( ) implies that p > w z (since w exceeds z); therefore, the e¢ cient level of f t is characterized by w z f t > w z or f t < 0: That is, e¢ ciency requires a negative level of administrative burden of …ring. Since the administrative burden of …ring can at most be reduced to zero, it cannot help achieve e¢ ciency because we have already seen earlier that when f t = 0 the decentralized outcome is ine¢ cient.
Intuitively, since c is too low in the absence of any intervention, a policy restoring e¢ ciency must raise c : Increasing the administrative burden of …ring (increase in f t ) ends up reducing c which makes the existing distortion worse. 19 While we are focusing on e¢ ciency, it is worth noting that increased administrative burden of …ring does succeed in lowering c , and hence reduces unemployment. Therefore, if the goal of policy is to simply reduce unemployment (say due to extraneous social costs of high unemployment), then in our set up an increase in f t is able to achieve this goal.
Firing Subsidy
The result above suggests that a …ring subsidy by the government may achieve e¢ ciency. Suppose we think of f t < 0 as a monetary …ring subsidy. Can such a …ring subsidy restore e¢ ciency? The e¢ cient 1 9 To see how ft > 0 lowers c below the e¢ cient level, note that p > w z implies that z > w p and hence z > w p ft: Following the same reasoning as in the proof of lemma 2, one can verify that the c that solves (26) is lower than the c that solves (17) . level of …ring subsidy is given by s = f t = p (w z) : That is, a …ring subsidy can restore e¢ ciency in the model. It can be …nanced by taxing pro…ts of …rms since such a taxation is non-distortionary in our setting. How would the government choose such a f t ? For any f t chosen by the government the corresponding decentralized equilibrium is c (f t ) and w(f t ) where x(f t ) is the equilibrium value of x for a given f t : The government solves f t = p (f t ) (w(f t ) z) to get the e¢ cient level of f t :
Therefore, a …ring subsidy delivers the e¢ cient level of c in the model.
Mandated severance payments
To obtain the expression for the equilibrium level of c with mandated severance payments, use b = = f t = 0 in (25) and obtain
Comparing (27) with (17) note that severance payments lead to e¢ cient c if p = w f w z.
Since U 00 ( ) < 0; the only solution to p = w f w z is f w = w z; that is, a severance payment that provides full insurance restores e¢ ciency.
How would the government choose such a f w ? For any f w chosen by the government the corresponding decentralized equilibrium is c (f w ) and w(f w ) where x(f w ) is the equilibrium value of x for a given f w : The government solves f w = w(f w ) z to get the e¢ cient level of f w :
As mentioned earlier, in our baseline model …rms have an incentive to o¤er severance payments of their own accord. However, in the extension with search frictions provided in the online appendix we show that voluntary severance payments alone cannot achieve e¢ ciency.
Unemployment insurance
To obtain the expression for c with unemployment insurance, set f t = f w = 0 in (25) and obtain
and the balanced budget condition implies = Again, comparing (28) with (17) Full insurance implies p = 0; while e¢ ciency requires p = w z: The two can be satis…ed together only if w = z and b = = 0; which cannot be true in any equilibrium (see proposition 1).
Thus, both severance payments and unemployment bene…ts can be used to achieve e¢ ciency, however, while the former provides full insurance to workers, the latter doesn't. Intuitively, full insurance through unemployment bene…ts is not e¢ cient because it reduces the cost of …ring for …rms leading to too much …ring. There is no such problem in the case of severance payments because severance payments make it costly for …rms to …re workers. That is, …rms correctly internalize the cost of …ring in the case of severance payments but not so in the case of unemployment bene…ts. The result has implications for welfare which is summarized in the proposition below and proved in the appendix.
Proposition 6:
The e¢ cient levels of severance payments and unemployment bene…ts yield the same levels of output, unemployment, and pro…ts, however, the welfare of workers is higher with e¢ cient severance payments than with e¢ cient unemployment insurance. Therefore, severance payments is Pareto superior to unemployment insurance.
While comparing severance payments and unemployment insurance, it is worth reiterating that mandated severance payments are equivalent to unemployment bene…ts funded by a layo¤ tax. Therefore, another way to state the result above is that unemployment bene…ts funded by a layo¤ tax are superior to the unemployment bene…ts funded by a payroll tax.
Comparing an e¢ cient …ring subsidy …nanced by a tax on pro…ts with the other two interventions, we …nd that the wage is higher in the case of a …ring subsidy, however, the welfare of workers is not necessarily higher because there is no insurance against unemployment risk. The pro…t of …rms before taxes is same as the pro…ts in the other two cases but the pro…t net of taxes is lower.
2 0 It was mentioned earlier that unemployment bene…ts can be …nanced alternatively using a payroll tax on …rms or a lump sum tax on all workers. The outcome (output, unemployment, pro…ts, welfare) with the e¢ cient level of unemployment insurance in either of these cases corresponds exactly to the case discussed in the text.
Globalization in the presence of labor market policies
As expected, if the labor market policies correct the distortion and restore e¢ ciency, then free trade is optimal. The following result is easily veri…ed in the appendix.
Proposition 7:
With e¢ cient labor market intervention in place, globalization unambiguously increases aggregate output.
The result above holds irrespective of the labor market intervention (…ring subsidy, severance payments, unemployment insurance) used to achieve e¢ ciency.
The impact of globalization on the welfare of workers and pro…t owners depends on what happens to the wages and unemployment rates, the key result summarized in proposition 2. It turns out that the result summarized in proposition 2 remains valid when labor market policies are optimally chosen. 21 Therefore, we obtain the same results on the welfare of workers and pro…t owners as summarized in proposition 4. That is, workers lose and pro…t owners gain if > While we have talked about commercial policies as well as labor market policies, it should be obvious that since the distortion is of a domestic nature (missing insurance market), commercial policies are inferior to labor market policies. Since commercial policy interventions distort the choice of imported inputs for …rms, they cannot restore production-e¢ ciency in the economy.
Discussions
In the model we have assumed that there is a unit measure of …rms and the production function exhibits diminishing returns to labor. We mentioned earlier that diminishing returns to labor could arise either due to limited span of control or due to the presence of a speci…c factor in …xed supply. To see the latter interpretation, suppose the production function in (1) is
2 1 For mandated severance payments and unemployment insurance the results in proposition 2 go through without any additional conditions, but in the case of …ring subsidy, we need a su¢ cient condition, (1 c)w > c p ; which is easily satis…ed for reasonable values of the risk aversion parameter :
where H is another factor of production in …xed supply (It could be physical capital or human capital).
The reward of this factor is r which is competitively determined. If the total amount of H in the economy is H, then it is easily veri…ed that rH = (1 )Z which is same as : Therefore, all the results in the paper go through with this alternative production function. 22 While our model is one of input trade, what is crucial for the results is the risk aversion of workers and the complementarity/substitutability between domestic labor and imports. The imports could alternatively be modeled as a …nal good instead of an input. The model can also be extended to a two …nal good setting with one of the two goods being labor intensive and the other being intensive in another factor of production. In this case the impact of globalization for the country importing the labor intensive good will be similar to the results for > (when domestic labor and imported inputs are gross q-complements). The advantage of our current framework with imported inputs is that we can capture these various cases in a more tractable set up with a single …nal good.
The model can also be adapted to the trade in tasks view of o¤shoring. While the earlier literature referred to any kind of input trade as o¤shoring, the more recent literature following Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) views trade in tasks as o¤shoring. Instead of there being two inputs in the production process, we could easily have a continuum of tasks some of which can be o¤shored more easily than others. Given this, some tasks will be performed at home and others will be performed abroad.
Increase in o¤shoring would mean more tasks being performed abroad. Whether that would lead to increase in demand for home labor or not will depend on the elasticity of substitution between tasks (See Groizard, Ranjan, and Rodriguez-Lopez (2014) for a model along these lines). The qualitative results will remain unchanged.
The model can also be applied to study the implications of immigration for the welfare of native workers. Instead of viewing the input M as the imported input, we could think of it as immigrant labor, in which case a change in the cost of hiring immigrant labor will a¤ect the welfare of native workers along the lines discussed in the paper. In fact, Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright (2013) use a model in a similar spirit where native workers, immigrant labor, and o¤shored inputs compete with each other in the production of a continuum of tasks. Each of the three groups has a comparative advantage in a subset of tasks, and the tasks themselves are combined using a CES function to produce the …nal good. In this setting they explore the implications of a decline in the o¤shoring cost or immigration cost on the employment of native workers.
Concluding Remarks
Unlike the standard models of unemployment where workers are risk neutral, we construct a model with risk averse workers and endogenous job destruction to study the welfare and policy implications of globalization. Globalization is modeled as a decrease in the price of an imported input which is combined with domestic labor to produce a …nal good. In this setting, the impact of globalization on aggregate output and the welfare of workers and pro…t owners depends crucially on whether domestic labor and the imported input are gross q-substitutes or gross q-complements.
Looking at policies, it is shown that the decentralized outcome is not production-e¢ cient due to the missing market for insurance against labor income risk. Therefore, a trade policy intervention can improve aggregate output. However, trade policy interventions have adverse distributional consequences if workers are poorer than pro…t owners. Common labor market policies such as mandated severance payments and unemployment bene…ts can …ll the gap created by the missing market for insurance and make the economy production e¢ cient. A …ring tax which does not result in a transfer to workers exacerbates the distortion due to missing insurance market. In fact, a …ring subsidy can make the economy production-e¢ cient. While both unemployment bene…ts and severance payments can alleviate the distortion and make the economy production-e¢ cient, severance payments result in better welfare outcomes when unemployment is caused solely by job destruction. When unemployment is caused by both job destruction and matching frictions, a policy that combines severance payments with unemployment bene…ts provides better welfare outcomes than a policy relying solely on unemployment bene…ts. Since setting up and administering unemployment insurance is costly, the use of severance payments by many developing countries may be an e¤ective policy tool to insure workers against the labor market risk. Finally, in the presence of labor market interventions that make the economy production e¢ cient, globalization necessarily increases aggregate output.
Appendix
7.1 Derivation of key equations (12), (13), (18) Using (9) in (10) obtain
Next, substitute (7) in (29) and simplify to obtain (12) . Next, note that equations (7) and (8) imply
Using (30) and (11) in (7) obtain (13).
Subtract (29) from (7) to obtain
Next, use (8) and (31) to obtain
Therefore, z L can be written as
Use the above in (31) to obtain
Equation (34) above is the expression (18) in the text.
The Planner' s problem
Using the notation de…ned in the text, write the f.o.c with respect to c and M as
From the above two f.o.c obtain
Substitute the above in (35) to eliminate M and obtain
Re-write (38) as
Next, verify that 
When …rms o¤er severance payments
Firms undertake the following maximization exercise.
where B 0 is the extra disutility from unemployment.
Using % to denote the Lagrangian multiplier on the constraint, the …rst order conditions for the maximization problem in this case are given by
The aggregate employment condition is again given by
The 6 equations (40)-(44), and (45) determine w; L; M; c ; f w and %:
Using (42) and (44) obtain
That is, …rms want to fully insure workers through severance payments (except for the disutility from unemployment component B): w = f w + z:
Next, using equations (40)-(43) obtain the equation below by following the same steps used in the derivation of (34) above.
Next, note that w = f w + z: Therefore, (47) can be written as
Therefore, for B = 0; the above becomes (17) . For B > 0 the decentralized c is production ine¢ cient.
Proof of Proposition 1
Totally di¤erentiating (12) obtain
Re-arrange the above as
Re-arrange the key equation (13) as
Use the following compact notation.
Note from (50) and the de…nition of that
Now, totally di¤erentiate (50) to obtain
Next, from the de…nition of ! obtain
Using the above expression for ! in (52) and (51) obtain
Collect the terms and re-write the above as
The inequality above follows from the fact that ( (1 ) 1) < 1: Next,
Finally,
Re-write above as
The inequality above follows from the fact that C 2w < 0:
Therefore, the coe¢ cients of (55) are
The coe¢ cients above imply that (50) gives a positive relationship between c and w in the ( c ; w)
space. As well, c ! 1 implies w ! 1 while w is a constant for c = 0: Let us call this constant w 1 :
Next, note from (49) that (12) gives a negative relationship between c and w. Moreover, w ! z from above as c ! 1 and w (> z) is a constant for c = 0: Let us call this constant w 2 : w 2 solves w = (w) where (w)
U 0 (w) : Therefore, existence and uniqueness of an interior solution ( c 2 (0; 1)) is guaranteed if w 2 > w 1 : In the risk neutral case, w 2 ! 1 as c ! 0; therefore, we always get a unique interior equilibrium. With risk averse workers, interior solution requires w 2 > w 1 which for a given set of parameters requires the workers to be not too risk averse. For CRRA utility function with as the risk aversion parameter, we numerically verify that there exists a such that at = , c = 0 and for < ; c 2 (0; 1): As well, is increasing in z; L; ; and and decreasing in A and : Essentially, the …rst order condition with respect to c (10) implies that for c = 0 the l.h.s of (10) must be less than the r.h.s at c = 0: Using (7), this boils down to w 1 < (w 1 ): w 2 > w 1 ensures that w 1 > (w 1 ); and hence, c > 0:
Proof of Lemma 2
It was veri…ed earlier from (39) that
U 0 (w) ; therefore, U 00 ( ) < 0 implies > w z; and hence, z 0 in (18) is less than z: It follows that the solution to ( c ; z 0 ) = 1 is smaller than the solution to ( c ; z) = 1: That is, 
Proof of Proposition 2
From (49) and (55) obtain the following expressions for the impact of o¤shoring on w and c :
Note from the signs of the coe¢ cients de…ned earlier that C 2w
Therefore, w and c move in opposite directions in response to globalization. Since the sign of C 2 is ambiguous, we have two relevant cases to discuss.
Case I: < 1 1
Impact of globalization on worker welfare
The expression for worker welfare is
Therefore,
7.7.3 = 1 case
In this case, the aggregate output can be written simply as
From proposition 2 which is valid for = 1 as well, it follows that 
The above maximization is same as the baseline model except that has been replaced by + t:
Therefore, the comparative statics with respect to given in proposition 2 go through. Denote + t by 
:
Recall from the text that the aggregate output is
Since the price of M faced by …rms is ( + t) ; the optimal choice of M implies @Z P @M = + t: Using this as well as (63) re-write the above as
Therefore, starting from free trade (t = 0), we get
7.8.1 Impact of tari¤s on pro…ts and workers:
Since tari¤ revenue is given back to pro…t owners, pro…ts gross of tari¤ revenue, denoted by 0 where 0 = + tM; is given by
The above implies
Again, using (63) re-write the above as
Since we have 
Equations for Labor Market Policies
In the decentralized equilibrium …rms maximize 
Using (82) write (83) as 
Now, substitute out M in (85) using (86) and use the equilibrium condition L = (1 c )L to obtain
Equation (87) is equation (25) in the text.
Proof of proposition 6
Denote the wage with e¢ cient …ring subsidy by w f t ; with e¢ cient unemployment insurance by w b ; and with e¢ cient severance payments by w f w : From (86) above verify that the value of M is identical in all cases. It follows from (80) and (81) that w b = w f w +
Firing Subsidy Case
Since we assumed that a …ring subsidy is …nanced by a tax on pro…ts, the expression for pro…ts net of taxes and subsidy is
Again, using (95) in the above and noting the fact that optimal …ring subsidy implies p = w z f t ,
Since the …ring subsidy doesn't a¤ect workers directly, the change in worker welfare is
It is veri…ed that proposition 2 goes through under a su¢ cient condition that (1 c )w > c p ; when the policymaker chooses the level of …ring subsidy optimally (results in online appendix). This condition is easily satis…ed in numerical simulations. Therefore, the impact of globalization on pro…ts and worker welfare is the same as in proposition 4.
Unemployment Insurance case
The expression for pro…t in this case is given by (102), and therefore, the change in pro…ts is given by (103). Using (95) in (103) and noting that optimal unemployment insurance requires p = w z; we again obtain (104). That is, the expression for the change in pro…ts is exactly the same as in the case of a …ring subsidy.
It is veri…ed that proposition 2 goes through even in the case when a planner chooses the e¢ cient of level of unemployment insurance funded by a tax on employed workers (results in the online appendix).
Therefore, the impact of globalization on pro…ts is same as in proposition 4.
The impact on worker welfare is slightly complicated. Recall that worker welfare in this case is given by
and the balanced budget implies = c 1 c b: Therefore, the change in the welfare of workers is
Grinding through algebra (proof in online appendix), it is veri…ed that the sign of 
